Should Bird Flu Research Be Suppressed?

Posted on | January 4, 2012 | Comments Off on Should Bird Flu Research Be Suppressed?

Mike Magee

Several years ago, Bird Flu (avian flu, H5N1), was the hottest topic in science reporting. We covered it closely from 2005 to 2009.(1) There were three major threads to our reporting: 1) H5N1 is a deadly virus. Since discovered in 1997, it has killed some 600 people. 2) H5N1 is not as dangerous as the 1918 Spanish Flu because is is not generally transmissible through the air. 3) If H5N1 ever gains that capability, watch out.

Well, H5N1 is back in the news – not because it is transmissable in humans – but because a number of studies are beginning to reveal that, with a few critical genetic mutations, this could occur.(2) The fact that this has not yet occurred naturally is reassuring. But what concerns the government and the World Health Organization is that, in the wrong hands, genetic engineering could “arm” H5N1 as a weapon.(3,4,5) They are therefore opposed to publishing details of experiments that might provide a road map for terrorists.

The broad facts are already fully available. Clearly, the capacity to unleash a pandemic is related to person to person transmission of the virus. Factors affecting H5N1 transmission include site of entry of the virus, cell location of the reproducing virus, and the manner in which it is expelled from the host individual.

H5N1 likes two things. First, it prefers warmer temperatures like those found in animals GI tracts. Secondly, it likes a certain type of cell receptor – the alpha-2,3 receptor (prominently present in avian digestive tracts). Lucky for us, the human nose and throat provides cooler temperatures and utilizes alpha-2,6 receptors. As a result, it’s been very difficult for the virus to move from one human to another.

Of course, in science, nothing is impossible if one comes armed with the basic science knowledge and molecular tools in hand. Bottom line, the PB2 gene activated can allow H5N1 to replicate at lower temperatures, and a mutated HA gene could allow H5N1 to attach to different receptors.

Up till now, the rare unlucky human to catch H5N1 harbored the virus deep in the lung tissue (where temperatures are higher and there are some alpha-2,3 receptors) usually as a result of transmission from a close family member or from occupational contact with infected birds. 50% of those infected died, but they generally did so without passing on the virus to another human. Thus, no pandemic.

Argument against revealing results of the H5N1 genomic studies: “It plays into the hands of terrorists.”

Argument for both the studies and their release: “Bad guys are going to do this anyway. You won’t be able to hide the results. And the knowledge will lead to readiness with an appropriate antidote which will act as a preventive determinant. And – suppression of publications would have a chilling effect on scientific progress overall.”

Complicated! What do you think?

For Health Commentary, I’m Mike Magee.

References:

1. Magee M. When flu returns in the fall, how bad will it be? HealthCommentary.org. June 9, 2009. https://www.healthcommentary.org/?p=144

2. Erasmus Medical Center, Rotterdam, release: “Virologists to observe bioterrorism recommendation of the US.” December, 2011. http://www.erasmusmc.nl/corp_home/corp_news-center/2011/2011-12/virologen.respecteren.advies.bioterror/?lang=en

3. Purvis C. US goverment asks science journals to redact flu research. Security Management. January 3, 2012. http://www.securitymanagement.com/news/us-government-asks-science-journals-redact-flu-research-009394

4. Ledford H. Call to censure bird flu studies draws fire. Scientific American. January 3, 2012. http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=call-to-censor-bird-flu-studies

5. WHO Press Release. WHO concerned that new H5N1 research could undermine the 2011 pandemic influenza preparedness framework. December 30, 2011.http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2011/pip_framework_20111229/en/index.html